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I introduced the “principle of inductive evidence” PIE in my paper “Creative subject and bar 
theorem” *. Because of a misunderstanding in my correspondence with the editors, the published 
version of the above paper is not the final revised draft, but a first outline of the article which needs 
some corrections and explications. I shall refer to the published version as CS. In CS I asserted 
somewhat rashly the absoIute equivalence of PIE and the monotonic bar theorem BIM by means 
of an ah too sketchy proof in the course of which I introduced in passing a rather problematic 
assumption without explaining it properly. Therefore I shall present here a more adequate 
treatment of the connection between PIE and BI,. In fact, I shall assume acquaintance with 
sections 1-2 of CS and provide a revised version of section 3. 
With respect to the activity of the creative subject Z and an existential 
statement 2~ P(X), we inductively define the species S of the stages of 
“inductive evidence” of Z&k P(X): 
i) if, for some m, e P(m), then FZE S; 
ii) if, for some pn, b YES, then YES. 
PIE: 5’=(nj ty Zx P(x)}. 
(In words: if Z has evidence of 3x P(x), then he has inductive evidence of 
zrx P(x)). 
Let a,/I . . . be variables for choice sequences, u, v .., variables for finite 
*In TheL.E.J. Brouwer Centenary Symposium, A.S. Troeistra and D. van Dalen (editors), North- 
Holland, 1982. 
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sequences (nodes of the universal tree). The length of a sequence 
u= (U& . . . . 24,) is !(u)=n+ 1, 
and the length of the empty sequence is I(( }) = 0. Initial segments of choice 
sequences are denoted by B(n) = (a(O), . . . , a(n - 1)). We write o E u for 
a(@)) = u. 
For a species R of nodes we inductively define the F-closure RF of R by: 
i) Vu(u~l?+u~R~) 
ii) Vu(Vk u*(k) ER~--WER~). 
R will be called monotonic if Vu Vv (u E R+u+v ER). R is a bar of u if VcxaEU 
2?n air. 
We state the monotonic bar theorem in the form 
MM: if R is a monotonic bar of ( >, then ( > E RF. 
THEOREM. ~h?+d?I,. 
PROOF. Let R be a monotonic bar of ( >. We introduce a creative subject Z 
and a lawless sequence Q whose value e(n) is chosen at the stage n + 1. So Z 
knows e(n) at stage II + 1 and cannot know it before. 
By particularizing the available proof of ViEIn a(n) E R, we get a proof of 
Ein pi R which does not use any information on the values of Q. Let us 
communicate such a proof to 2 and let him insert %z pi R among his 
theorems at stage 0. So ‘0 3n .@z)E R. Call S the species of stages of 
inductive evidence of 3~ e(n) E R. 
By PIE we have 0 E S. According to the inductive definition of S, a proof of 
0 E S is built up from the following elementary inferences: 
Replacing every statement of 
inferences 
a3 
3m ‘n @(rn)~R 
&z)ER~ ’ 
b) 
an ty-- ??2ES 
TlES * 
the form XE S by Q(X) E RF, we obtain the 
W 
2i’m v .&rn)~R’ 
pars ’ 
We prove the correctness of a’), b’). 
Since R c RF we may restrict ourselves to b’). Suppose that, for some m, 
v &@+zR’. 
If IZ em, observe that, since R is monotonic, RF is monotonic too (by 
induction on the construction of RF), whence p(n) E RF+ 
If n <m, since at the stage IZ 2’ knows only the initial segment p(n) of Q, we 
get Vc@(n)*~(m -n) E RF), whence, by induction on m -n, p(n) E RF. 
Thus we can transform the available proof of 0 E S into a proof of ( ) E RF. 
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REMARK. In the above proof we have used the following principle: if k 
P(@m) with m > n, then k Va P@(n) *a(m - n)), where Ilu P(u) is a property 
of nodes. This principle is evident provided the definition of P does not involve 
@ (e.g. it does not hold for P: u E 8). In fact, we have tacitly assumed that, given 
the bar R, we can find a Q not involved by the definition of R. 
The key of the above proof consists in transforming, by means of the lawless 
sequence Q, the bar statement into an existential statement. It does not seem 
quite evident that, conversely, one could always transform an existential 
statement into a bar statement. So, since PIE concerns all existential 
statements, it seems stronger than BIM. In fact, I think that PIE cannot be 
logically reduced to other known principles. Perhaps PIE provides for 
existential statements a strongly constructive meaning which, though in 
accordance with the intuitionistic use of 3, is not implicit in the usual intuitio- 
nistic understanding of 8. 
To bring out how BI, helps to assert PIE, we introduce a further epistemic 
principle (perhaps more elementary than PIE) under which the imphcation 
BIM-+PIE holds. 
Suppose that 2, at the stage 0, has evidence of XX P(X). Then he knows a 
procedure 7t to calculate an instance of P(x). Though, at the stage 0, such an 
instance, because of a possible lack of information, may not yet be determined 
(see C’S section 2), nevertheless 2 knows a priori that certainly, at some future 
stage, the instance will be determined, no matter how the information proceeds. 
It seems to me quite reasonable to interpret such a state of knowledge as a bar 
assertion according to the following “principle of spreadlike information”. 
PSI: Any proof, at the stage 0, of XX P(x) consists in 
a) arranging all a priori possible pieces of information (relevant for n) in a 
lawlike spread s; 
b) recognizing that s is barred by the species R of those pieces of information 
which are sufficient to execute rc. 
More explicitly, the above s represents the whole a priori possible information 
in the following sense: 
i) ( > represents the piece available at the stage 0; 
ii) if u ES represents the piece at the stage IE, then the successors u *{k) of u 
in s represent those pieces which, at the stage IE, E knows as possible for the 
stage n+ 1. 
THEOREM. PSIA BIM-+ PIE. 
PROOF. According to our strict conception of creative subject (see CS, 
section 2), we intend the above assertion in the following sense: assuming PSI 
and BIM, we can instruct Z so that PIE holds. 
Suppose TV-- Xx P(x) and let s and R be as in PSI. Let cr~s be the 
“sequence of information”. This means that, for all II, 6(n) is the real piece 
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of information available at the stage n. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
s to be the universal spread. To every UER~ we assign an instruction 1”. This 
will be executed by 2 at the stage I(u) provided n E 0 and will have the effect 
that l(u) E S. 
We define 1, by induction on the construction of RF: 
i) u ER. 1,: if u E 6, at the stage l(u): 
a) carry out the procedure R by means of u and determine an instance P(m) 
of P(x); 
b) insert P(m) among your theorems. 
Thus if UE 0, then k P(m), whence I(u)ES. 
ii) u eRF and all lualkj are already defined. 
I, : if u E IT, at the stage I(u) 
a) observe that for some k (knowable at the stage I(u) + 1) u*(k) E Q so that, 
in virtue of lu*(kj, Z(u) + 1 6 S. 
b) Insert I(u) + 1 E S among your theorems. 
Thus Ir(u) I(u) + 1 E S whence l(u) E S. 
Since, by MM, ( ) ERR, the instruction I( > makes the theorem true. 
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